From Chapter 3

The harder they fall

Worker control

Nothing comes out of nothing. The militancy in the 1970s had a long, if fractured past. The most persistent attempt by labourers to take charge of their jobs had been over the quality of scaffolding. From the ABLF's foundation in 1910, its members had argued for their organisers to be authorised as inspectors. Denied that endorsement, organisers and delegates took it upon themselves to stop dangerous jobs. A similarly informal expression of worker control came when rank-and-filers refused to clamber over shoddy scaffolds, taking the sack rather than risk their lives. During the revolutionary upsurge at the end of the Great War, Victorian Secretary Mulvogue became the Secretary of the One Big Union which identified safety with job control committees.[1] To head off that movement, capitalists began promoting works councils to contain the appeal of workers' councils (soviets).

In the main, consultations on site were unknown. Foremen appointed safety committees on some jobs in the 1950s. The Victorian Building Industry Agreement of 1956 was the closest to a formal arrangement, though its discussions were conducted among officials, not around the sites.[2] From the start of the Opera House project in the late 1950s, lead contractors encouraged employees to become involved with health and safety.[3]

The key was action on the job backed by the union. Bosses sacked delegates who insisted on safety inspections and standards. Rank-and-file action got most reinstated. Those conflicts often sparked wider campaigns. For instance, sixteen Sydney BLs on a wharf demolition at Circular Quay in 1958 not only had their safety conditions improved, they also won an extra 37s a week and 15 minutes shower-time.[4]

Building workers exerted direct control through disagreements over whether it was raining hard enough to stop work and to receive "wet money". Although the Awards gave the final say to the employer, labourers still had agree to go out in the rain. From the late 1950s, they realised that breaking a concrete pour strengthened their bargaining hand.[5] Refusing to work in the wet then delivered a knock-out blow, and laid the seed-bed for worker control. Another source was the refusal to work under arrogant foremen.[6]

As the ABLF regained its militancy throughout the 1960s, its activists institutionalised these initiatives. The crunch came during struggles to establish safety committees, and to determine their membership and powers. BLs insisted on electing health and safety delegates with the authority to stop work when conditions were not up to scratch . During 1965, Costains in Queensland agreed that a safety officer be elected from the job to check on safety. Nonetheless, the men at Swanbank stopped over the lack of safety and first-aid officers. During a compulsory conference, the contractor promised that "a full-time man would be put on but that they [the BLF] would have to have a conference with the employers to decide who would subsidise the man."[7]

In February 1969, the NSW BTG refused to work anywhere they considered unsafe. This resolution initiated the "Clean Up the Building Industry" campaign, with the NSW BLF banning free-fall hoists after November.[8] The MBA advised its members to go along with this policy, though they protested at the loss of managerial prerogative.[9] After 176 mishaps on the Citra job on the Warringah Mall, the death of a worker provoked a four-week strike by 209 unionists. When they went back, they elected two full-time safety officers, one by the tradesmen and the other from the BLs. In Canberra, on 17 April 1972, BLs on the Citra job in Kingston stopped work at lunchtime over amenities and hazards. The company agreed that the only work be on fixing both. The BLs were paid an extra $4 a day until their delegates agreed that safety was up to the mark.[10]

The NSW Branch pushed a policy of workers on the job having the final say on whether it was safe to proceed. For example, on May Day 1972, a meeting of all grades and trades – again except carpenters - at the Sydney Law Courts elected a safety committee of two BLs, a Boilermaker and an electrician with the right to stop work on unsafe areas. The four were to meet management for an hour each week to monitor the site. Three weeks later, on 22 May, worker control there faced a new test. An engineer declared a crane safe. The riggers insisted on additional beams, refusing to start until they were installed. On 25 May, a 9 am meeting of BLs endorsed the riggers' decision. In rejecting their assessment, the company proposed that the crane be lifted with two Porta-Powers. If that method did not succeed, they promised to put in the two extra beams. The workers said "No". The company suggested that the union employ an engineer to give a second opinion, but declined to pay for the advice. The ban remained.[11]

Contesting issues of health and safety or amenities moved past half-day disputes on this or that site. A pattern emerged. BLs civilised their environment at work by taking charge of hour-by-hour operations. Moreover, they upended their relationship with management by influencing investments. That policy followed BTG calls since the 1930s to put more resources into public housing, schools and hospitals rather than into office blocks. From 1969, the Victorians asserted their right to have a say about which buildings they worked on.[12]

By 1973, worker control was challenging the rule of capital at every level in the building industry. Action on sites had grown towards dual power with elected site committees telling the managers who to employ, what to do, and when.[13] In defending the built and natural environments, the ABLF limited the opportunities for profit-taking. The policy of No-Ticket No-Start laid a foundation for an attempt by the NSW Branch to achieve permanency through union-hall hire.[14] The MBA built its case against the Federation on the disruptions around worker control over amenities and safety. These challenges to Messrs Construction Capital combined to convince the Federal Court in June 1974 to de-register the union.[15]

1 OBU Herald, February 1919, p. 1.

2 Frank T. de Vyver, "The Melbourne Building Industry Agreement", Journal of Industrial Relations (JIR), 1 (1), April 1959, pp. 7-19, and "The Melbourne Building Industry Agreement: A Re-Examination", JIR, 12 (2), June 1970, pp. 166-81.

3 BB, April 1964, p. 2; Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, v. 106, Parts II & III, November 1973, p. 11; Sarah Gregson, "Who built the Opera House?", Anne Watson (ed.), Building a Masterpiece, the Sydney Opera House, Powerhouse Museum, Sydney, 2006, pp. 122-35.

4 BLJ, March 1958, p. 4.

5 BLJ, September 1957, p. 3; McDonald, Intimate Union, pp. 87-88; NSW Industrial Commission, Transcript, 5 March 1959, p. 2, MLK 04269; Queensland Minutes, 23 July 1968.

6 For example, Unity, December 1966, p. 9.

7 Queensland Executive, 10 & 14 May 1965.

8 Jack Mundey to NSW Labor Council, 20 October 1969, MLK 04266.

9 MBA to Mundey, 4 November 1969, MLK 04265.

10 NSW organisers' diary, 17, 24, 25 and 27 April 1972, MLK 04274.

11 NSW organisers' diary, 1, 23, 25 and 31 May, 6 June 1972, MLK 04274.

12 Victorian Executive, 28 October 1970, Special, 10 November 1970.

13 Pete Thomas, Taming the concrete jungle, the builders laborers' story, NSW Branch of the ABCE&BLF, Sydney, 1973, pp. 31-49; John Wallace and Joe Owens, Workers call the tune at the Opera House, National Workers' Control Centre, Sydney, 1973.

14 Commonwealth Conciliation & Arbitration Commission, Transcript, No. 983 of 1973, 29 May 1973, pp. 6 and 11, MLK 04273.

15 NSW organisers' diary, 1972, MLK 04274; SMH, 3 October 1972, p. 11a-c, and 23 and 25 May 1973, p. 1 and "Editorial"; Employers' Review, July 1973, p. 127, November 1973, pp. 217-21, and November 1974, p. 160; Builder NSW, July 1973, pp. 290-94, November 1973, p. 488; Australian, 17 September 1974; Australian Archives, A10146 (2004/00725431) 1973/68; 23 Federal Law Reports (1974) 356.